Month: September 2016

Petition for Rehearing Denied
by

Petition for Rehearing Denied

The Petition below to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was Denied by Chief Justice Sharon Prost, and two new kids Judge Chen and Judge Stoll. See the Court order 13-petition-denied Note: denial of this petition affects the precise outcome predicted long before the complaint was ever filed see the blog post Any doesn’t Mean Any Anymore

Below is the petition as submitted and denied. Note: The Court has dismissed this case for failure to state a claim. No request, in this case, was ever made to Amend the Complaint. Plaintiffs do not believe the complaint is deficient but, rather the court simply wishes to impose the Government’s will with false statements and reliance on assumption rather than fact.

The Federal Courts participate in these proceedings as if they were Counsel for the Defense of the U.S. Government. There is literally no appearance of impartiality by the Federal Judiciary.

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1 The Panels decision conflicts with decisions of the United States Supreme Court in:

United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009);

United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349,63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980);

United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976);

Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct.Cl. 599, 607,372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (1967));

Compagnie General Transatlantique v. United States, D.C., 21 F.2d 465, 466.(1927);

The Court of Appeals for the Federal District Opinion relies on:

Trevino v. United States, 557 F. App’x 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Hufford v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 696, 702 (2009);

Plaintiffs find no indication, other than the Court’s reliance and citation; these cases are binding precedent in the Federal Court of Claims or in the Federal Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. To the extent, they are Plaintiffs seek to have them overruled.

  1. 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) is a money-mandating statute conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. §1491(a)(1) based on identifiable decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.

 The Court of Appeals states at 5 ¶2 of their Opinion:

“to the extent that Plaintiffs now argue that the RICO Act is, itself, a money-mandating statute conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims,4 we hold that it is not.[1] See Trevino v. United States, 557 F. App’x 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Hufford v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 696, 702 (2009).“ [2]

This statement of the Court presents numerous issues.

First, the Court implies by this statement Plaintiffs had not previously argued RICO Act was a money-mandating statute, which is false, and evidenced by the Courts footnote 4 and the fact it is specifically stated in the Complaint at Dkt item 1. p.14 ¶42(3) (Consideration)

“This statute providing a civil cause of action identifies a source of substantive law separate from the Tucker Act creating a right to monetary damages”

It was further discussed in Plaintiff’s responsive reply brief Dkt. Item 7 (C) p. 20-23. Second, by implication, the Court appears to concede RICO is a money-mandating statute but contends its one that does not confer jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims.[3] The Court has then cited precedent that Plaintiffs were not afforded the opportunity to address. If it’s the Courts contention, the Federal Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction to hear a criminal RICO case plaintiffs would agree that’s true, however, if it’s the court’s contention the Federal Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction with regards to RICO’s civil cause of action as another separate source of law mandating compensation by the Federal Government when paired with the Tucker act; Plaintiffs would argue that’s not in accordance with the Court of Federal Claims mandated jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1491(a)(1), or with the Supreme Courts interpretations which Plaintiffs relied on in filing the complaint. The plaintiff’s Complaint alleges Jurisdiction under the Tucker Act of 1887, codified at 28 U.S.C. §1491(a)(1), which allows the Court of Claims to entertain claims against the United States “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress. 18 U.S.C §1964(c) is an act of Congress and a Federal statute. The Supreme Court stated: Justice Anton Scalia United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009);

““Neither the Tucker Act nor the Indian Tucker Act creates substantive rights; they are simply jurisdictional provisions that operate to waive sovereign immunity for claims premised on other sources of law (e.g., statutes or contracts).” Quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980) “The other source of law need not explicitly provide that the right or duty it creates is enforceable through a suit for damages, but it triggers liability only if it “`can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government.” (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct.Cl. 599, 607, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (1967)) [4]

The court must recognize that in District court case 4:13-cv-00054 JLK; while liability usually lies with a third party defendant in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §1964(c), The liability in case 4:13-cv-00054 JLK and consequently this instant case lies with the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government was rightfully the defendant in the RICO civil suit filed in a Federal Court of appropriate jurisdiction. The court as agent/trustee for the U.S. Government and We The People converted the terms of the agreement to become judge, jury, and defendant, dismissing its own case without due process of law in violation of the Plaintiffs’ procedural rights. The Government in this case is liable for damages as both Defendant and as agent/trustee, which breached its fiduciary duty of care with regards to the Plaintiff’s procedural rights.[5]

Justice Blackmun United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976);

“The Tucker Act is merely jurisdictional, and grant of a right of action must be made with specificity. The respondents do not rest their claims upon a contract; neither do they seek the return of money paid by them to the Government. It follows that the asserted entitlement to money damages depends upon whether any federal statute “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.“[6]

In this instant case, Plaintiffs have rested their claims upon a contract created with the grant of a private cause of action and although they do not seek the return of money paid by them to the Government, they have asserted entitlement to monetary damages based upon substantive rights conveyed to the plaintiffs by congressional grant with the evocation of federal statute 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) in case 4:15-cv-00054-JLK. When the Federal Government is the defendant in a RICO case the money mandate of the statute is the liability of the Federal Government and the Federal Government is additionally liable as agent/trustee when breaching its duty of care.

Judge Davis Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct.Cl. 599, 607, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (1967));

“But it is not every claim involving or invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation which is cognizable here. The claim must, of course, be for money.”

“In the second group, where no such payment has been made, the allegation must be that the particular provision of law relied upon grants the claimant, expressly or by implication, a right to be paid a certain sum” [7]

Plaintiffs have from the beginning maintained the particular provision of law relied upon 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) expressly granted them the right to treble damages, attorney’s fees, and court cost i.e. to be paid, a certain sum of money-mandated compensatory damages, that the promise (Offer) of these substantive rights to property was conveyed by Congresses explicit grant of a civil cause of action with 18 U.S.C §1964, a grant, which conveyed the promises (offer)[8] of those damages by the filing of a complaint under 18 U.S.C. §1964(c). That this particular provision of law relied upon conveyed the promise an express written offer to Plaintiffs who met the stated terms of qualification, adhered to terms of performance, and anticipated assuming the position of a Private Attorney General for the prosecution of a US Government operated RICO enterprise. Justice Aufustus Hand Compagnie General Transatlantique v. United States, D.C., 21 F.2d 465, 466,(1927).

 “* * *. To limit the recovery in cases `founded’ upon a law of Congress to cases where the law provides in terms for a recovery would make that provision of the Tucker Act almost entirely unavailable because it would allow recovery only in cases where laws other than the Tucker Act already created a right of recovery. `Founded’ must therefore mean reasonably involving the application of a law of Congress. * * *” [9]

 The court’s findings the RICO Act does not confer jurisdiction is correct however, the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1491(a)(1) which says founded upon any Act of Congress and under the Supreme Courts interpretations of that Statute, a RICO’s Civil Cause of Action filed against the U.S. Government creates a reasonable right of recovery from the Federal Government.

As Justice Scalia conveys other sources of law (e.g., statutes or contracts) triggering liability if it can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government. Justice Blackmun’s entitlement to money damages confers where “any” federal statute can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained. Judge Davis, the allegation must be the particular provision of law relied upon grants the claimant, expressly or by implication, a right to be paid a certain sum. Justice Aufustus founded means reasonably involving the application of a law of Congress.

18 U.S.C. §1964(c) is a Federal statute (a law of Congress) granting to a private citizen, meeting stated requirements, the mandated promise of treble damages, attorney fees, and court cost, for accepting the Governments offer of compensation in exchange for prosecuting a criminal case in the public interest. When the Federal Government is the defendant in a criminal RICO case it’s fair to interpret the statute as expressly mandating compensation of a certain sum from the Federal Government. Furthermore, as an agent/trustee of the U.S. Government, which breached its duty of care in the prosecution of a Government Agency, the Federal Government becomes libel for the full potential benefit of a successful prosecution.

The Court’s reliance on Trevino v. United States, 557 F. App’x 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014); and Hufford v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 696, 702 (2009).“ is Misapprehended; neither of these cases involved a breach of contract or takings claim, for a specific performance failure, where the RICO statute had been evoked in an appropriate jurisdiction. Neither of these cases looked at RICO as another source of law mandating compensation by the Federal Government on which a breach of contract or taking claim under the Tucker act was founded. Neither of these cases looked at a civil action under the RICO statute.

However, if the court’s contention 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) does not fall within the Courts jurisdiction Plaintiffs challenge such an interpretation as not in accordance with the jurisdictional mandate for 28 U.S.C. §1491(a)(1) nor in accordance with Supreme Court precedential interpretation of the jurisdiction conferred on the Court as discussed supra.

To the extent Hufford v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 696, 702 (2009) is a precedential opinion in the Federal Circuit which was relied on in Trevino v. United States, 557 F. App’x 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs would ask to have this precedent overruled by the Federal Circuit. The Court stated its justification in Hufford v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 696, 702 (2009) at p.5 B. “The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Criminal Claims”

“This court has no jurisdiction over RICO claims because RICO is a criminal statute.” And excluded 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) by specifically referencing “18 U.S.C. §§1961- 62”

In Trevino v. United States, 557 F. App’x 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014) The Court stated:

“These claims do not fall within the court’s jurisdiction as defined by the Tucker Act because none of those statutes or constitutional provisions mandate the payment of money. See Hufford v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 696, 702 (2009) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over RICO claims).”

In Hufford v. United States, the Court found it-lacked jurisdiction because RICO was a criminal statute and specified §§1961- 62, however, 18 U.S.C §1964(c) grants a “Civil” cause of action, not “Criminal” a civil case where the United States was the defendant. The contention the Court lacks jurisdiction is inconsistent with Supreme Court interpretations of the court of Federal Claims jurisdictional mandate under 28 U.S.C. §1491(a)(1) as discussed supra. If the Federal Court of Appeals has found as the Plaintiffs consistently argued 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) is a Federal Statute mandating compensatory damages for economic injuries i.e. a money-mandating statute see Dkt. Item 7 (C ) p. 20-23, and Plaintiffs maintain it is. Then it would fall within the Court’s jurisdiction and the misapprehended conclusion of Trevino v. United States, 557 F. App’x 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Statute that does not “mandate the payment of money” is false.

  1. 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) Grants a Private cause of action a clear indication the legislature intended to create private Contractual or vested rights.

The Court of Appeals states at 6 ¶2 of their Opinion.

“Plaintiffs’ allegations do not establish that any contract existed between Plaintiffs and the government. Plaintiffs’ Characterization of §1964(c) as a contract “offer” is false.” “[A]bsent some clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption is that a law is not intended to create private contractual or vested rights” “Nothing in RICO Act suggests it was intended to function as a contract offer to private citizens.” [10]

The Court of Appeals states at 4 ¶5

“ Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only when a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”

And at 5 ¶1.

“we must assume that all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint are true.”

However, the court has based its argument on the reliance on an assumption, the presumption the legislature did not intend to bind itself contractually. The Court has assumed Plaintiffs could prove no set of facts to support the claim 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) constitutes a valid offer and that in fact the statute is intended to convey contractual private rights. Contrary to the Court’s precedent in Hufford v. United States “RICO is a criminal statute.” 18 U.S.C. §1964 is the congressional “GRANT” for a “CIVIL” cause of action of criminal offenses, a clear indication Congress intended to convey to the private citizen the vested right to prosecute a criminal offense for compensation. [11]

Plaintiffs would ask the Court? How this statute conveys the right to prosecute and the compensatory damages to a private citizen if not by offering to do so? How does a Pro Se become a “Private Attorney General” for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate, a woefully painful, unusual, challenging, and demanding position, without an offer from Government to do so? The term applies only to the exercise of one’s ability to pursue certain specific kinds of legal actions statutorily authorized (offered). It does not create the ability to call one’s self a “private attorney general”. Consequently, the term is only applicable to a private non-attorney citizen who has accepted the statutory offer to do so.[12]

The Senate reports on the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees award Act of 1976 S. Rep. 94-1011 p.6 (1976) The Committee acknowledged that,

“[i]f private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation’s fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.”

The Senate obviously intended to offer citizens, the opportunity to recover what it cost them to vindicate their rights in Court. [13]

Whether it’s a Grant, cognizable as a taking or an offer as a contract [14]neither is applicable without the Plaintiff’s acceptance of the rights and promises conveyed and a Plaintiff cannot assume private attorney general status without a valid acceptance of the authorization to do so. Furthermore, the statute provides, a promise of substantial and significant benefit to the American people, the potential demise of USDA’s RICO enterprise. This Court has balanced the scales of justice with assumptions rather than facts inconsistent with the Court’s procedural rule FRCP 1. They should be construed and administered to secure the “just” determination of every action.

The Court’s reliance on Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465–66 (1985) (quoting Dodge v. Bd. of Ed., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937)). ).“ Is a Misapprehended assumption for injustice and to the extent the Court relies on the case as precedential Plaintiffs seek to have it overruled in this instance.

  1. Plaintiff’s claims are at the bottom a request the Court of Federal Claims review whether the Government violated the Plaintiffs procedural due process rights and failed faithfully to perform its agency/trustee duties effecting a breach of contract or taking of personal property.

The Court of Appeals states at 5 ¶2 of their Opinion:

“Plaintiffs’ claims are, at the bottom, requests that the Court of Federal Claims review the Western District of Virginia’s decision to dismiss Plaintiffs’ earlier action.”

This is false! Plaintiff’s claims are at the bottom a request the Court of Federal Claims review whether the Government violated the Plaintiffs procedural due process rights and failed faithfully to perform its agency/trustee duties affecting a breach of contract or taking of personal property conveyed to the Plaintiffs by an act of Congress. Rights granted with the specific intent to grant Plaintiffs status as a prosecutor of Government corruption, in a Government violating the fundamental laws of this Nation, in a prosecutorial void, where the Government’s action aided the Government in avoiding prosecution and affected the Government will to unconstitutionally write new law preserving the Governments corrupt objectives. [15] To the extent the court relies on Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) Regarding this matter Plaintiffs would seek to have the precedent overruled in this instance.

Submitted by,

Christopher B Julian Pro-Se

[1] Emphasis added.

[2] The court states “Plaintiffs now argue” yet it’s noted in footnote 4 that plaintiffs consistently argued this point throughout the proceedings. It was in fact the DOJ who argued the RICO’s damages were not money-mandating.

[3] In all prior arguments, the defense argued the statute was not money mandating and the Court did never clarify it.

[4] Emphasis Altered.

[5] That Judge Jackson L. Kiser chose to deny the Plaintiffs procedural rights to aid the Government’s RICO enterprise is a matter between him and the Government.

[6] Emphasis altered.

[7] Emphasis Altered.

[8] To an aggrieved farmer whose business has been wiped out by government actions the prospect of being paid a reasonable attorney’s fee to prosecute the offender is a very attractive offer.

[9] Emphasis added.

[10] Emphasis added.

[11] A Pro Se would be entitled to the same Attorneys fees as a Plaintiff represented by counsel

[12] The relationship might be different if an attorney prosecuted the case for a non-attorney client in anticipation of collecting an attorney’s fees.

[13] The burden of proof in a civil case is a preponderance of the evidence.

[14] How is it appropriate for the Court to presume the legislature did not intend to bind itself contractually without allowing for the presentation of evidence to the contrary?

[15] As an Article I court, the duty of Congresses separation of powers responsibility, to hold the Federal Judiciary accountable has been conveyed to the Court of Federal Claims. The Courts Duty is to render justice against the Government in favor of citizens just as it would administer between private individuals. It just takes one bad apple corp. to spoil the whole bushel.

Up-Date 10 -8- 2016 For benefit of readers you should know that every one of the court’s prior arguments was shown to be based on the incongruent premise. The court did not and could not provide any argument for accepting as true their faulty unsupportable premises. So where this argument suggests a precedent be overruled it was not without significant prior support for doing so.  The very fact that this court supported their opinion with precedent on statutes that were different from the bases of the filing and arguments shows their specific intent was to deny justice. I.e. Criminal RICO and Civil RICO are different statutes!!

Judging the Judges of a Judge.
by

Judging the Judges of a Judge.

You should be paying attention. What’s presented in the Court of Appeals Federal District Case 16-1889, is a case before the second highest court in America, where the questions are; whether the Federal Government is liable for criminal acts of a Federal Judge who’s violated a legislative promise to the American people to hold Government accountable to the law, and whether the Federal Judiciary will protect, hold accountable, or should judge, a Superior Federal District Court Judge for aiding and abetting the USDA‘s criminal enterprise, protecting it from prosecution.

I say, If not, there’s no case in America where the judiciary will hold a member of the judicial corp. accountable, and the judicial system is quite simply corrupt and the rule of law in America meaningless. The results are in see: Petition for Rehearing Denied

The plaintiff’s claims are a request the Court of Federal Claims review, whether the Governments employee “ Federal Superior District Judge Jackson L. Kiser violated the Plaintiff procedural due process rights and failed faithfully to perform his duty as an agent/trustee affecting a breach of contract or taking of personal property, conveyed to Plaintiffs by an act of Congress “Title 18 Chapter 96 §1964(c)”. Rights granted by legislation with the specific intent to appoint the plaintiff as a prosecutor for the express purpose of prosecuting Government corruption “the USDA’s RICO enterprise”, in a Government agency violating the fundamental laws of this Nation “ the due process and equal justice clauses of the constitution of the United States, in a prosecutorial void “ The DOJ defends Government Agencies even criminal ones”, where the Government’s action “The Actions of Federal employee Superior Federal District Court Judge Jackson L. Kiser aided and abetted the Government “ The USDA’s RICO enterprise” in avoiding prosecution and effected the Governments “USDA’s” will to unconstitutionally write new law “ Usurping the legislators and the Judiciary” while preserving the Governments “USDA’S” criminal and corrupt objectives [1] as a criminal abusive tyrant.

It’s all just one big happy Government Criminal Racket however, the Legislative intent was to prevent judicial collusion by creating a civil cause of action for a criminal offense placing the verdict in the hands of a Jury and not the Judiciary.

Under the Tucker act, the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009). a Plaintiff  “must identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties, and allege that the Government has failed faithfully to perform those duties.”  “If that threshold is passed, the court must then determine whether the relevant source of substantive law `can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of a breach of the duties [the governing law] impose[s].'”

Due Process and the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution are substantive sources of law, and impose an agency / fiduciary duty on a Judge, to abide by the law, his oath of office, his judicial cannons, the federal rules of civil procedure, and in this instant case a fiduciary duty is imposed on him to protect the property rights, treble damages, attorney fees, and court cost that flow from the Plaintiffs economic damages and the restitution promised by statute  18 U.S.C.§1964(c) for bringing suit against the U.S. Government for racketeering.

  1. Judge Jackson L. Kiser breached his fiduciary duty by dismissing the charges for failure to state a claim while denying a single amendment to the Complaint by a Pro -Se his court instructed not to make legal arguments, cite cases, or statutes. This is a case alleging a government conspiracy to deny due process and equal justice, A felony, and when done as a racket an act of treason on the constitution and the American People. How seriously did Judge Jackson L. Kaiser take his oath to uphold the law and the constitution?
  2. The Statute promises treble damages, Attorney Fees, and court costs to the successful litigant. The supreme court has stated these are economic damages for economic injury see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates][107 S.Ct. 2759, 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987)]: “RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy economic injury by providing for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. Where the Federal government is the defendant it  can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government.”

There’s a solid case Judge Jackson L. Kiser failed faithfully to perform his fiduciary and agency duties in the application of a federal statute which can fairly be interpreted as mandating treble damages, court cost, and attorney’s fees as compensation by the Federal Government. Understand Judge Jackson L. Kiser Lied. He made up alibis and manipulated the true nature of the evidence to dismiss the charges in the first place. see: Corrupt Federal District Court Of Federal District Judge Jackson L. Kiser – Traitor

So far the Court has not acted as a neutral adjudicator but as an attorney for the defense of the U.S. Governments’ criminal operations like a Judiciary criminally protecting organized crime.

[1] As an Article I court, the duty of Congresses separation of powers responsibility, to hold the Federal Judiciary accountable has been conveyed to the Court of Federal Claims. The Courts Duty is to render justice against the Government in favor of citizens just as it would administer between private individuals. It just takes one bad apple corp. to spoil the whole bushel.

For more on this topic see Federal Court Opinion Balances Scales of Justice With Lies. And Integrity & Independence in the Federal Judiciary.

CB Julian

@blueridgesprings

Blueridgesprings.wordpress.com

Not a Pro Pro-Se Per Se.

Letter to Judge Robert J. Conrad August 29,2016.
by

Letter to Judge Robert J. Conrad August 29,2016.

Christopher B. Julian

474 Orchard View Drive

Ararat Virginia, 24053

980-254-1295

Christopher.b.julian@gmail.com

Pro Se   Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

Christopher B. And Renee G.

Julian

Plaintiffs(s),

V,

Bank Of America N.A. Et Al

 )

)

 Case Number: 3:16-CV-173

Letter to the Honorable Judge Robert J. Conrad

Requesting the Court ruling on the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis                             

Letter requesting the Courts ruling on the prior motion to proceed In Forma Pauperis.

Plaintiffs Christopher B. and Renee G. Julian; here and after referred to as Plaintiffs, respectfully request the Honorable Judge Robert J. Conrad rule on the motion to proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP) Docket item 2 based on the following justifications.

Justifications:

Case 3:16-CV-00173 has been on the court’s docket for four months.

 If the court finds the Plaintiffs financially eligible and the complaint meritorious Plaintiffs believe they have a fundamental right under the 7th Amendment for the case to continue and the court should require issuance and service of process. If the court finds for any reason the complaint is deficient then the court should allow for amendment of the complaint unless its deficiencies cannot be cured. Plaintiffs would request if the court finds for any reason the complaint deficient Plaintiffs be granted a request for leave of Court to amend the complaint.

This Case has the potential to assist Plaintiffs with legal aid in the Prosecution of another Federal case in the Publics interest.

 Plaintiffs informed the Court in the Complaint “C” Docket (DKT) Item # 1 at p.6 footnote 1. Plaintiffs would again bring Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) charges against the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Additionally, in “C” p.41 footnote 17 RICO Provides for a civil cause of action and places the Plaintiff into the role of a prosecutor. And at “C” p.47 footnote 18 Defendants in this instant case may site the USDA for contributory negligence. Consequently, the Plaintiffs believe Counsel for the Defense in this instant case would have a compelling reason and standing to assist the Plaintiffs, in the RICO prosecution of the USDA.

The Initial predicate acts of the RICO filing occurred in October of 2012 and the Supreme Court has shortened the RICO statutes, the statute of limitations, to four years. See Rotella v. Wood et al., 528 U.S. 549 (2000). Pro Se Plaintiffs have concerns about the Statute of Limitations for refiling the RICO Complaint and the effects of the RICO’S continued operation on others. True, the Plaintiffs originally filed in September 2013, and believe the Courts should grant equitable tolling for the statute of limitations but, that remains a concern, and Plaintiffs believe the Defense Counsel in this instant case could provide significant legal expertise in the prosecution of the RICO case in the Publics interest.

Legal Expertise and the Poor’s need for assistance.

The importance of legal expertise in protecting civil rights laws and assistance with the Legal cost is detailed in the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976. Where legislators stated see: S. Rep. 94-1011 p.6 (1976).

“In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who

must sue to enforce the law and has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation’s fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.”

“Congress has instructed the courts to use the broadest and most effective remedies available to achieve the goals of our civil rights laws.”

“If the cost of private enforcement actions becomes too great, there will be no private enforcement. If our civil rights laws are not to become mere hollow pronouncements which the average citizen cannot enforce, we must maintain the traditionally effective remedy of fee-shifting in these cases.”

As a Pro Se with little or no money, as the motion for IFP purported; Plaintiffs have found the cost of private enforcement actions too great, and the Civil rights laws protecting the people’s fundamental rights hollow. Taking on the U.S. Federal Government in legal action was of no interest to law firms who insisted on compensation rates from $200 to $800 dollars an hour to look at the case’s potential. Consequently, Plaintiffs were and are monetarily prohibited from shopping the RICO case, and legal firms are not willing to review a case’s potential, free of charge, nor were they interested in long-term potential litigation efforts against the U.S. Government for potential future compensation. Consequently, Plaintiffs have handled all the legal efforts as Pro – Se now for more than 3 years against the largest law firm in the Nation. The benefit of legal assistance cannot be understated, which brought the Plaintiffs to realize this instant case creates a common interest with the Defendants’ legal counsel to pursue prosecution of a Government-run criminal enterprise. The Court’s delay in responding to the Motion to proceed IFP denies Plaintiffs potential access to much greatly desired legal assistance if the court finds the case meritorious.

Prompt litigation to combat racketeering is an obvious objective against the legitimate business activities of organized crime.

The Supreme Court’s justification for the shortening of the Statute was that eliminating racketeering the sooner the better is a proper objective see Rotella v. Wood et al., 528 U.S. 549(2000) and Footnote 3 of ¶557

“This objective of encouraging prompt litigation to combat racketeering is the most obvious answer to Rotella’s argument that the injury and pattern discovery rule should be adopted because “RICO is to be read broadly” and “ ‘liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes,’ ” Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Impex Co., 473 Pub. L. 91–452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947).”[1]

Furthermore, in the Supreme Court decision of Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates][107 S.Ct. 2759, 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987)]: The Supreme Court stated:

“The antitrust laws now provide a well-established vehicle for attacking anticompetitive activity of all kinds. They contain broad discovery provisions as well as civil and criminal sanctions. These extraordinarily broad and flexible remedies ought to be used more extensively against the `legitimate’ business activities of organized crime.” 113 Cong. Rec. 17999 (1967).[2]

And of particular interest should be the citations of the congressional intent. “be used more extensively against the `legitimate’ business activities of organized crime.” And “Congress has instructed the courts to use the broadest and most effective remedies available to achieve the goals of our civil rights laws.”

The plaintiffs request the court rule on the Motion to proceed In Forma Pauperis, effecting the process of service or alternatively, to dismiss the case for lack of merit, or identify the Complaint’s deficiencies and grant the Plaintiffs leave to amend. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs request the court’s acknowledgment of the connection and intent for equitable tolling in the Plaintiff’s RICO case. The continued delay, is a delay of fundamental rights, inflicting further emotional distress, continued financial distress, delaying potential access to legal aid, further potential harms to discovery, and prescribing an appearance of prejudicial treatment. Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court realize, Plaintiffs assume, had the court found the complaint significantly lacking in merit the Court would have already dismissed the case.

Respectfully Submitted,

Christopher.B.Julian Pro-Se

[1] Emphasis Added.

[2] Emphasis Added.

Up-Date 10-7-2016- On September 27th Judge Robert J. Conrad denied after more than 5 months on the docket, A friendly nudge of the court clerk at 3 months, and a month after receiving this letter the request to proceed in forma Pauperis. This is interesting for both its timing; the day after the court of Appeals in the Federal Circuit made their lies final. see federal-court-opinion-balances-scales-of-justice-with-lies & petition-for-rehearing-denied AND On three prior occasions the Federal Courts granted In Forma Pauperis status, the last one was granted 2 days prior to this filing, with the same financial information. Go Figure? Today the Court Fees were paid and the summons issued. Yesterday,  morning the court received via certified mail see USPS Confirmation a motion for the court to reconsider its ruling. It’s interesting and reeks of impropriety that the court docketed the motion as received on 10-7-2016 when USPS confirmed delivery on 10-6-2016. and the Signed receipt for delivery shows received 10-6-2016 Interesting, it was docketed and stamped received 10-7-2016 today after the court fees were paid. The facts unfolding in this court suggest we are once again destined to be treated with impropriety. This ruling while not what we would have liked does suggest three key things. Note: we paid the filing fee after submitting a motion to reconsider the IFP order because we believe the IFP order to have been a function of the will and not one of judgment. A judge can never change his will only an inappropriate judgment. The Court for all the aforementioned events has forfeited rights to respect. 

  1. The judge must have found the case to have merit.
  2. The judge did not find the filing deficient but, we shall see the replies and how they’re handled.
  3. The Judge must have found the defendants owed the plaintiffs the duty of care in the negligence allegations. We shall see.